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Comparative Models in German Elections: 
Using the German Far-Right Party as a 
Proxy for Ethnic Conflict
Clay H. Parham
Baylor University
Abstract
 In 2017, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) became the first the far-right party 
to win seats in the Bundestag since 1933. By campaigning on ethnic division, the AfD saw 
an unprecedented rise in support, especially in East Germany. This paper tests two models 
of ethnic conflict within comparative politics, primordialism and constructivism, to see 
which better explains the result of the AfD’s 2017 election. By examining the rhetorical 
use of political advertisements, the Manifesto Project’s analysis of the AfD’s platform, and 
differences of support between East and West Germany, the paper finds that constructivism 
better shows that highly-educated elites within the AfD purposefully constructed ethnic di-
vision to gain political support. Clear implications are drawn for the future of the two ethnic 
models and for European far-right politics.
Keywords
 Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany), comparative politics, 
 far-right, ethnic conflict, 2017 German election
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1. Introduction
 Far-right parties’ popularity in Western Europe increased drastically since the 
1980s. Some authors have pointed to this increase as a kind of “silent counter-revolution” 
to the New Left – parties such as the Greens or the European Left (Ignazi, 2016). Others 
argue that the far-right originated as “contemporary capitalism” activated “political partisan 
appeals to economically rightist positions” were increasingly effective (Kitschelt, 1995). Still 
others argue that the far-right revolution is simply a continuation of the political develop-
ment of Europe (Cole, 2005). It is clear there is not a consensus of where far-right parties’ 
support originated, but what is clear is that while far-right parties have been increasing in 
popularity for decades, the Alternative für Deutschland's (AfD) unprecedented success after 
one election signals a new era in far-right European politics.
 There have been a plethora of proposed reasons for the AfD’s success in Germany: 
an economic slowdown, fears about immigration, or distrust and disdain for German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel and the EU. Little English-language academic literature relating to the 
AfD’s election exists. However, German literature provides some insight into their success. 
An article published immediately following the election examined the relationship between 
the AfD and the economic position of voters in Germany, finding “the lower the ability and 
the lower the income, the higher the AfD’s chance of election” (Söllner, 2017). Conversely, 
most news publications point to the AfD’s anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic policies as the 
predominant factor behind their support (Eddy, 2017; Hagen, 2017; Hill, 2017). However, 
no consensus exists as to why East Germany had higher vote totals for the AfD, something 
remarked upon by Hill (2017) shortly after the election. The following research hopes to 
shed some light on the AfD’s activation of ethnic conflict.
 Germany has a troubled history of far-right nationalism, but until recently, Ger-
man far-right parties had not found success in national elections. However, the 2017 elec-
tion showed far-right nationalism is not dead in Germany. Far-right nationalism gained in 
Poland and Hungary, and the National Rally (formerly National Front) party in France 
usually controls 10-15 percent of the legislative seats, but in 2017, AfD became the first 
German far-right party to gain seats in the Bundestag since 1933. Interestingly, the AfD’s 
support divided geographically between the former-communist German Democratic Re-
public (East Germany) and the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 
East Germany had significantly more support for the AfD. The stark difference between East 
and West Germany in support for the AfD, and the AfD’s anti-immigration rhetoric, means 
there we have a rare opportunity for a within-case test of two ethnic conflict models within 
comparative politics, primordialism and constructivism. Based on an analysis of how these 
two models explain ethnic conflict, I conclude that a constructivist approach best explains 
the differences between East and West Germany and their support for the AfD. 
 I begin this paper by describing background on the founding and political position 
of the AfD. Then, I outline the effectiveness of using the AfD’s vote total as a dependent 
variable to test models of ethnic conflict. Next, I analyze the test case using a primordial 
model and constructivist model. Finally, I conclude with normative statements about the 
rise of far-right nationalism in Europe and the greater Western world.
2. Dependent Variable
 Since Europe does not presently experience violent ethnic conflict on a large scale 
like Africa or parts of Asia, a proxy must be used if we wish to test models of ethnic conflict. 
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Necessarily, this requires a different dependent variable than violent conflict. Additionally, 
Europe’s overall domestic stability and security position means the sample size for race-
related crimes is low. Instead, our model must unavoidably differ from traditional measures 
of ethnic conflict. Fortunately, the AfD campaigned along primarily ethnic lines, which 
makes them a suitable proxy as a measure of ethnic conflict, and the prevalence of election 
and demographic data in Germany adds quantitative data to our research. As such, the de-
pendent variable for this paper is regional support for the AfD in Germany. 
 Using this dependent variable gives us several advantages. First, Germany’s po-
sition as a recently-separated-but-ethnically-German state means we can test primordial 
theory’s ethnic component. Second, the AfD’s changed its political platform to a message 
that highlighted ethnic division, making their actions an appealing test case for constructiv-
ism. Finally, a marked difference exists between East and West Germany’s support for the 
far-right party, testing primordialism’s hypothesis that ethnic divisions are long-standing and 
unchanging. Thus, Germany serves as an effective within-case comparison for ethnic con-
flict models. Using this within-case comparison gives us the ability to test long- and short-
term cultural differences as well. Since primordialism and constructivism test those cultural 
differences respectively, that gives us additional robustness within our test. 
3. Model 1: Primordialism
 Primordialism is a theory within comparative politics where ethnic conflict origi-
nates in long-standing ethnic divisions. Under primordialist theory, differences are fixed be-
tween ethnic groups based on a mixture of filial relationships and biological underpinnings. 
Filial relationships and biological underpinnings are expressed through the “perceived com-
mon origin, skin color, appearance, religion, language or some combination thereof” of the 
members of an ethnic group (Bayar, 2009). Everyone belongs to one but only one ethnic 
group. There are several measures of ethnic diversity, but the ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion index (ELF) is a popular, albeit outdated, index for much of Europe. However, under 
primordialism, “ethnic diversity (as measured by the ELF) is often seen as a ‘problem’ and 
many policy responses rest on the assumption that multi-ethnic societies are conflict-prone 
and that ethnic mobility needs to be lessened or eliminated where possible” (Alesina & Fer-
rara, 2005; Muro, 2015). Once assumed, ethnic identity is unchanging, and differing ethnic 
identities in close proximity can lead to ethnic conflict.  
 By playing off of primordial feelings of German nationalism and targeting Islamic 
refugees, the AfD make this an effective case in which to test the primordial model. East and 
West Germany had only been separated for a few decades, and while van Hoorn and Mase-
land (2010) found that there were cultural differences between the two groups, especially in 
terms of market economy compatibility (with East Germans being surprisingly more biased 
towards market economies), a primordial theorist would say that the few decades they were 
separated would not lead to substantial ethnic differences. If this model were true, East and 
West Germany should not have significant ethnic differences, and ethnic conflict should be 
present in regions with high percentages of people with a migrant background, regardless of 
geographic location. Furthermore, if primordialism is correct, we should see no difference 
in the voting percentage for the AfD for either East or West Germany. Upon close analysis, 
however, the number of refugees in a population has no correlation on the strength of the 
AfD. 
 Unfortunately, while Alesina and Ferrara’s (2005) EFL is usually an effective indi-
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cator of ethnic fractionalization in a country, the number of refugees from the Syrian crisis 
has made the index outdated and unusable. Instead, to further test this model, I gathered 
information from the German Federal Returning Officer’s website, where the Federal Gov-
ernment compiles demographic data to the voting precinct level (“The Federal Returning 
Officer,” n.d.). Additionally, while testing this model, differences between East and West 
Germany should not be significant once controlling for number of people with a migrant 
background. 
 Table 1 is a regression analysis of demographic, economic, and social data of Ger-
man voting constituencies. This data shows that, contrary to the primordial model, higher 
numbers of migrants in a voting district actually appreared to decrease the AfD's vote share 
(Parham, 2019). In actuality, there remained a significant difference in the AfD vote share, 
controlling for number of people with a migrant background, depending on whether the 
voting constituency was in East or West Germany, with East Germany seeing a much higher 
voting share for the AfD. Clearly, primordialism in this test case is not well supported by 
the empirical data. Instead of a constituency with many immigrants resulting in more sup-
port for the AfD, we see the opposite effect. Additionally, the primordial model would not 
suggest sizeable differences between East and West Germany’s vote share for the AfD. The 
influencing factor would instead be the number of people with a migrant background living 
in the area. However, the critical factor still seems to be an East/West divide. Moreover, 
primordialism fails to account for other, non-homogenic cultural differences (language, re-
ligion, etc.) in Germany between East and West.
Table 1. Regression Results from 2017 German Election
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                           
Observations                   75                           75                           75                
R-squared                   0.796                        0.842                        0.802                
                                                                                                           
Constant                    18.54**        (3.33)        13.68**        (2.70)        30.61**        (2.91)
Centrist                                                                             -0.164         (-1.35)
AfD's Vote Share i~o                                     1.270***       (4.30)                             
Unemployment Rate          -0.578*        (-2.06)       -0.412         (-1.64)       -0.531         (-1.89)
% Admitted to Uni.         -0.106         (-1.95)       -0.123*        (-2.53)       -0.116*        (-2.12)
GDP per Capita          0.0000201          (0.38)    0.0000491          (1.04)    0.0000170          (0.32)
% with Migrant Bac~d       -0.117         (-1.02)       -0.116         (-1.14)       -0.130         (-1.14)
% of the Pop. Ove~60       0.0202          (0.11)      -0.0510         (-0.30)       0.0362          (0.19)
Migration Balance          -0.309***      (-3.48)       -0.243**       (-3.03)       -0.284**       (-3.14)
Birthrate Replacem~t       -0.215         (-0.69)       -0.335         (-1.20)       -0.235         (-0.76)
Population Density      -0.000439         (-1.01)    -0.000303         (-0.78)    -0.000711         (-1.49)
% of Pop. Foreign           0.384          (1.94)        0.278          (1.57)        0.319          (1.57)
Former East Germany         12.51***       (8.51)        9.740***       (6.70)        9.484***       (3.54)
                                                                                                           
                          Model 1                      Model 2                      Model 3                
                                                                                                           
AfD's Vote Share
 The data show high ethnic fractalization does not translate to higher vote totals for 
the AfD in Germany. We would expect the AfD’s vote totals to not be linked to geographic 
area within Germany but rather to the number of immigrants living within a community. 
What we instead see is the dividing line between East and West Germany as the primary 
factor for the AfD’s vote totals. A primordialist theorist may say that Germany has only uni-
fied relatively recently (Bismarck formally unified Germany in 1871) and so ethnic divisions 
may be along other geographic lines like former kingdoms or Catholic/Protestant divide. 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/6
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However, upon viewing a map of the AfD’s vote percentage, the clearest dividing line is 
between East and West Germany, not from other possible dividing lines.1 This in itself in-
validates the primordialist model, but the other data presented above further show that the 
primordialist model does not fit this case study.
4. Model 2: Constructivism
 Constructivism theorizes that ethnic conflict is constructed by leaders in order to 
drive political agendas. Specifically, “constructivists go beyond making the instrumentalist 
point that elites and intellectuals deliberately select and rework pre-existing social and cul-
tural traditions to engineer products that resonate with the masses,” by clarifying “why indi-
viduals think that ethnic and national boundaries are meaningful, valuable or useful” (Barth, 
1970; Muro, 2015). For constructivists, political leaders are able to recognize what could 
serve as cultural or ethnic identities and activate those differences. In fact, constructivism 
serves as a counterpoint to primordialism, since “(1) individuals have multiple, not single 
ethnic identities; (2) these identities are constructed and can change (although often they do 
not); and (3) such change, when it occurs, is the product of some human process” (Chandra, 
2012). Skillful elites are then able to harness ethnic identities to make salient certain political 
points. 
 The AfD is a relatively new political party in Germany. Their origi-
nal political platform focused on economic issues, primarily Euroscepti-
cism and anti-Eurozone. In fact, the AfD’s founders, Alexander Gauland, Ber-
nd Lucke, and Konrad Adam, were a mixture of economists and journalists.2 
However, because of the backlash from German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s stated im-
migration policy of “wir schaffen das” (we can manage this) after nearly 1 million migrants 
arrived in Germany seeking asylum, AfD party members elected nationalist Frauke Petry 
in 2015 as their leader. Under Petry’s leadership, “Alternative for Germany [AfD] shifted 
its focus to domestic security and immigration. Its tone became increasingly nationalistic, 
populistic and — its critics said — racist” (Eddy, 2017). Interestingly, the policy shift also led 
to a dramatic increase in support for the AfD. While the AfD gained some political points in 
the 2013 election, they did not receive 5% of the vote, failing to achieve the apportionment 
threshold for parties to gain seats in the Bundestag. The position shift in 2015 preceded dou-
ble-digit victories in the 2016 state elections of Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, 
and Saxony-Anhalt and a surprising upset in the 2017 election, where they received 12.6% 
of the national vote and became the main opposition party.
 We would expect, under a constructivist lens, the political elite in the AfD to 
engineer ethnic identity to gain political favor. However, the support for the AfD would 
take root specifically in East Germany, since, according to Alesina and Ferrara (2005), “rich 
democracies are more capable of ‘handling’ productively ethnic diversity,” and East Ger-
many has a bleaker economic outlook than West Germany (Aumann & Scheufele, 2010). 
Further research by Dancygier (2010) found that ethnic conflict primarily exists in places 
of economic scarcity. The poor economic conditions in East Germany, compared to West, 
would show why East Germans felt ethnical divided. The AfD’s success in East Germany 
1 See Appendix 1.
2 It is interesting to note that all three founders of the AfD and Frauke Petry, the AfD’s political leader during the 
election cycle of 2017, have doctorates. The party began as a collection of highly educated economists and journal-
ists, and party leadership today has kept that tradition of advanced education.
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would result from the creation and activation of ethnic differences between Germans and 
migrants. 
 Like most states behind the Iron Curtain, East Germany lags behind West Germany 
economically. However, Fuchs-Schündeln and Izem (2012) argue that traditional measures 
of human capital in East Germany, i.e., years of schooling or education level, were higher in 
the East than in the West. This should lead to higher economic outcomes, but instead labor 
productivity has remained low in the geographic East. In fact, by 2001, economic prospects 
for East Germans commuting into the West became equal with their western counterparts, 
but workers remaining in the East continued to lag (Burda and Hunt 2001). Studies show 
that wage gap and unemployment differences between East and West, caused by sharp wage 
increases, “deteriorated competition and led to an increase of unemployment” (Smolny, 
2009). Aumann and Scheufele (2010) found the East’s unemployment rates should be equal 
to the West’s ten years following the publication date, while gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita and manufacturing production will be equal in 49 and 94 years, respectively.
 Most important for this case study, though, is the AfD’s transitional language from 
Euroscepticism to ethnic nationalism. To indicate if this transitional language was effective, 
the same variables as those in the primordial model will be used, namely level of support 
in East versus West Germany. Additionally, the AfD would have had to consciously shift 
its political message to ethnic conflict, showing that the “elites and intellectuals deliberately 
select[ed] and rework[ed] pre-existing social and cultural traditions” (Muro, 2015). If a size-
able difference in voting share for the AfD exists and the party has changed its message to 
illuminate cultural differences, then the model may be proven useful in this test case.
 The clearest indicator of the political shift from Euroscepticism to anti-immigra-
tion can be seen by looking at the Manifesto Project’s efforts to track political changes in 
party platforms. The Project shows a clear shift in feelings about European integration (be-
comes less opposed) and multiculturalism (becomes more opposed) (Volkens et al., 2018).3 
The transition in rhetoric from Euroscepticism to anti-immigration correlates closely with 
the increased vote percentage for the AfD. Clearly, some measure of ethnic identity was 
reached. 
 As commented on above, English-language academic literature on this most recent 
German federal election is sparse, but newspaper and long-form reporting commented on 
the curious dividing line of AfD support between East and West Germany. In fact, the AfD 
gained 21.6 percent of the vote in former East Germany, significantly higher than the coun-
try-wide average of 12.6 percent (Hagen, 2017). It is worth noting that the models tested 
are for general ethnic conflict, and the AfD, which campaigns primarily on anti-immigrant 
nationalism, Islamophobia, and general Euroscepticism, used ethnic and nationalist language 
during their campaign. The AfD’s political advertisements were overtly racist, saying things 
such as “Islam? Doesn’t fit our cuisine,” “Burkas? We prefer Bikinis,” and “New Germans? 
We make them ourselves” (Wildman, 2017). Since the AfD used ethnic language in their 
campaigns, their surge in East Germany serves as an effective lens from which to study con-
flict and rhetoric’s impact on vote shares in Western Europe. Because far-right success is a 
novelty in Germany, journalists frame the AfD as a fledging, far-right organization, outside 
the norm of German politics. However, we can find expansive English-language literature 
on East Germany’s economic and political recovery, and naturally German sources delve 
3 See Appendix 2.
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more deeply, and often more empirically, into the 2017 German election.
 Several psychological studies comparing East and West Germans found marked 
differences between them. First, narcissism indexes and self-esteem scales between East and 
West Germans, and in adults who graduated from the East German education system and 
children who did not, starkly differ. Vater, Moritz, & Roepke (2018) found that East Ger-
mans are typically less narcissistic and more self-confident than their western counterparts. 
Regarding economic and cultural differences between East and West Germany, van Hoorn 
and Maseland (2010) found that cultural differences between East and West Germans do 
exist. However, these cultural differences do not impact economic performance. 
 Existing research seems to match the first part of the constructionist theo-
ry, that the party deliberately changed its position to appeal to ethnic differences.4 
At the very least, the Manifesto Project’s findings from 2013 to 2017 show a sizable shift 
from Euroscepticism to anti-immigration. The second part of the theory—that it should 
only effect East Germans because of the bleak economic development of East Germany—is 
also confirmed. Again, this is borne out in Table 1, where the regression found sizeable dif-
ferences between the AfD share of the vote for East and West Germany. Accordingly, the 
parameters of the constructivist model have been met.
5. Conclusion
 Primordialism has been all but discredited in comparative politics, and this study 
has again shown why it is no longer widely accepted. By using Germany as a within-case 
study, controls for a primordial model are already in place, and we find that the model is not 
viable. In contrast, for the test case of the 2017 German election, a constructivist approach is 
more suitable. What appears to be deliberate rhetoric by the leaders of the AfD to frame the 
election in ethnic terms (anti-immigration, anti-Islam, etc.) has taken hold in East Germany, 
a region of Germany struggling economically. Like any general theory, constructivism can 
be refined to better match this test case, but the generalized theory is still sufficient. As the 
far-right continues to gain in Europe, a constructivist approach can be used to better un-
derstand and analyze their base of support, helping to solve the voters’ ills and issue effective 
counter-campaigns to these parties.
 While this may seem ostensibly to have implications for only Germany, the rise of 
far-right parties in Poland and Hungary speak to a larger issue at play. Despite reunification 
and the inclusion of a former Soviet state into Germany, Germany has remained a leader of 
the European Union. Seeing such a powerful result for the far-right electorally, especially 
in Germany, is worrying for the European Union and for other like-minded international 
bodies. However, the previous success of moderate parties in the East show that the far-right 
surge in Germany can be avoided. Instead of playing to demographic data, or simply ignor-
ing East Germans’ political power, moderate German political parties must consider cultural 
differences between East and West.
4 It is difficult to decode if the AfD, and specifically Petry, gained political power by using existing ethnic resent-
ment or if they bred ethnic resentment to gain political power. However, it is clear that Petry specifically was the 
catalyst for ethnic division in the AfD’s platform. Immediately preceding the 2017, Petry was ousted from the 
party, and since, the party has appeared to return to Euroscepticism (see their recent campaign against the EU’s 
diesel car directives).
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AfD's 2017 Election Results (Foster, 2017)
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Appendix 2
Manifesto Project's Analysis of AfD's Rhetorical Shift from 2013-2017 (Volkens et al., 2018)
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